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Unemployment compensation has been "the Nation's first line
of defense"' against economic crisis. Its traditional purpose has been
to provide economic security for workers with a high labor force
attachment2 during transitory periods of unemployment.3 Fluctuat-
ing economic conditions, however, have made it necessary to sup-
plement the primary state system with a federal extended benefits
program, which provides additional payments in times of high un-
employment to those who have exhausted their regular state ben-
efits.4 Because the United States continues to suffer the highest
unemployment rate5 as well as the longest projected period of high
I Hearings on Unemployment Compensation Benefits Before the Subcomm. on Unemployment
Compensation of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1975) (testimony
of Lawrence E. Weatherford, Acting Associate Manpower Administrator for Unemployment
Insurance) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Unemployment Compensation].
- A worker must be employed for a certain number of weeks to qualify for state
unemployment benefits. Although this requirement varies from state to state, 14 to 20 weeks is
the usual period for qualification. Id. at 48. If a worker fails to meet the state's qualifying
requirements, he will not be entitled to receive any federal extended unemployment benefits.
3 The House Ways and Means Committee, in reporting out the Social Security Act,
outlined the objectives and limits of the new program:
The essential idea in unemployment compensation . . . is the accumulation of
reserves in times of employment from which partial compensation may be paid to
workers who become unemployed and are unable to find other work. Unemploy-
ment insurance cannot give complete and unlimited compensation to all who are
unemployed. Any attempt to make it do so confuses unemployment insurance with
relief, which it is designed to replace in large part. It can give compensation only for a
limited period and for a percentage of the wage loss.
H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess 7 (1935) (emphasis added).
4 See notes 16-26 and accompanying text infra.
' The average unemployment rate for 1975 was 8.5%, the highest rate since 1941, when
the rate was 9.9% due to the lingering effects of the 1930's depression. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 73 (1960). May 1975 represented the
highest monthly rate of unemployment for the year, with a total of 9.2% of the labor force
(8,538,000 workers) out of work.JoINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL OF ECONONIC
ADVISORS, ECONOMIC INDICATORS 10-11 (June 1975). By March 1976, the national un-
employment rate had dropped to 7.5% (7,027,000 workers). N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 1976, at 1,
col. 8 (city ed.).
There has been growing criticism of the method employed by the federal government in
compiling the unemployment statistics. Conservative critics argue that the statistics should
only include serious cases of joblessness. More liberal critics, however, contend that the
government underestimates the number of unemployed because the figures do not include
long-term unemployed workers no longer searching for work or receiving unemployment
compensation, slum residents who have never had jobs, and part-time and temporary work-
ers. Id., Jan. 11, 1976, § 1, at 36, col. 5 (city ed.). This criticism has led many Ford Administra-
tion officials to recommend that the President appoint a special committee to study possible
redefinitions of unemployment and alternative methods of compiling unemployment statis-
tics. Id.
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unemployment since the 1930's depression, 6 the burden of provid-
ing for the increasing needs of the long-term unemployed has re-
cently shifted to the bxtended benefits program.7 In response to this
economic crisis, Congress has expanded the potential duration of
extended benefits to the present maximum of sixty-five weeks.8
Although it is widely recognized that substantial high-level un-
employment reflects permanent structural changes in the economy, 9
Congress has attempted to deal with these changes through a system
designed solely to deal with short-term unemployment. A tension
has thereby been created in attempting to solve long-term problems
with short-term solutions. 10 The additional extensions of benefits by
Congress represent a patchwork of legislation 1 that has brought
' During the 1930's depression, the unemployment rate stayed above 5.0% for eleven
years. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 73 (1960).
The Ford Administration has forecast that the unemployment rate, above 5.0% since Jan.
1974, will not return to that level until 1980, the longest consecutive period since the
depression. N.Y. Times, June 26, 1975, at 26, col. 2 (city ed.).
The number of insured workers who exhausted their regular benefits rose from
340,000 for the Oct.-Dec. 1973 quarter to an estimated 900,000 for the Apr.-June 1975
quarter, and is projected to peak at 1,100,000 for the Jan.-Mar. 1976 period. SENATE COMM.
ON FINANCE, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STAFF DATA AND MATERIALS ON UNEMPLOYMENT 27
(Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as SENATE COmM.]. The financiaL burden of providing
for these workers has fallen on the federal extended benefits program. Many insured workers,
however, have also exhausted their extended benefits. For the Oct.-Dec. 1975 quarter, Con-
gress estimated that 600,000 workers would exhaust their 26-39 week benefits (as compared to
37,000 workers in the Oct.-Dec. 1973 quarter), 400,000 workers would exhaust their 40-52
week benefits, and 200,000 workers would exhaust their 53-65 week benefits. Id. These
workers must rely on welfare, family, or friends for assistance. For a description of a program
that provides some assistance to unemployed fathers whose families qualify for Aid to Families
with Dependent Children see Note, 1975 Developments in Welfare Law-Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, 61 CORNELL L. RFv. 777 (1976).
8 See notes 94-101 and accompanying text infra. The 65 weeks of unemployment benefits
referred to in the text are composed of 39 weeks of extended federal benefits and 26 weeks of
regular state unemployment benefits.
I See notes 108-11 and accompanying text infra.
10 In debate on the House floor, Representative Ketchum defined this tension:
The principal question we must ask is whether we wish UI to remain an unemploy-
ment insurance program or whether it is to serve as the vehicle for an income-
maintenance program....
When we move into continued extensions of the program, when we move into a
year or more of UI eligibility, the basic concept must change. ...
... Sooner or later, if we keep extending the benefits, the money to pay for them
will come out of the General Treasury.
It is at this point, to which I submit we are rapidly moving, that unemployment
insurance actually becomes an income-maintenance program, of extended duration
and funded by every American's tax dollars. I believe that we should at least have the guts
to call it by that name, and admit what we have done.
121 CONG. REC. H 4527 (daily ed. May 21, 1975) (emphasis added).
11 See notes 69-106, 138-40 and accompanying text infra.
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state and federal programs to the brink of insolvency. 12 With this
increased burden, the extended benefits program has been both
confusing and inadequate in its operation, and it has aroused wide-
spread criticism from employer and labor groups alike.13
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the federal extended
benefits program within the framework of the existing unemploy-
ment compensation system and to explore alternatives for dealing
with long-term unemployment. In the years since Congress first
enacted the extended benefits system as a temporary program in
1958,'14 it has been increasingly relied upon to alleviate the hardships
of the long-term jobless. With the prospect of substantial long-term
unemployment for years to come, 15 it is important to reconsider the
basic assumptions underlying the present approach.
I
OVERVIEW OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Congress enacted the present federal-state system of un-
employment insurance in 1935 as part of the Social Security Act.' 6
12 On April 8, 1975, it was reported that over half of the state trust funds were below the
level considered safe. Eight trust funds had already been depleted (Connecticut, Mas-
sachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington), and 20
states faced the possibility of exhausting their funds. The Federal Trust Fund was also
operating at a deficit, requiring two advances totaling $1.4 billion from general revenues to
remain solvent. The Ford Administration has proposed that $1.5 billion from general rev-
enues be loaned to the states, and that an additional $1.5 billion be transferred to the Federal
Trust Fund to pay for the federal share of extended benefits. Hearings on Unemployment
Compensation, supra note 1, at 63 (statement of Lawrence E. Weatherford).
13 Id. at 320-29 (testimony of James H. Tinsley, Chamber of Commerce of the United
States); id. at 233-40 (testimony of George Hotton, Julius Kubier, and Randolph Hale,
National Association of Manufacturers); id. at 353-63 (testimony of John Dankosky and J.
Thomas Weyant, representing Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce and Pennsylvania
Employers Conference respectively); id. at 257-66 (testimony of John Stayt, Pennsylvania
Manufacturer's Association); id. at 74-82 (testimony of Frank Walsh, William Heartwell, and
Robert Goodwin, Interstate Conference of Employment Securities Agencies, Inc.); id. at
267-73 (testimony of Bert Seidman, Director, Department of Social Security, AFL-CIO); id. at
165-84 (testimony of Melvin Glasser and George Strugs, United Automobile Workers of
America); id. at 542-44 (statement of Coalition of Black Trade Unionists); id. at 545-46
(statement of Wilbur Daniels, International Ladies Garment Worker's Union).
14 The Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-441, 72
Stat. 171.
15 See note 6 supra.
16 42 U.S.C. § 501 (1970). For general discussion and analysis of the unemployment
compensation system see S. BLAUSTEIN, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE OBJECTIVES AND ISSUES
(1968); V. CARLSON, ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES (1962); CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, STATE VERSUS FEDERAL CONTROL OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPEN-
19761
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Under this system, states were induced to establish their own un-
employment insurance programs in compliance with federal
guidelines through the use of a tax credit. The 1935 Act levied a
federal unemployment tax of three percent, now 3.2 percent, on the
payrolls of all covered employers, against which a credit was allowed
for payment of state unemployment taxes up to 2.7 percent. 17 The
constitutionality of the unemployment compensation system was
upheld by the Supreme Court in 1937,18 and by 1938 every state had
enacted an unemployment compensation system in conformity with
the Social Security Act.
The federal statute specifies which workers are protected and
which payrolls are subject to the federal tax. 19 Currently, the federal
tax applies to employers with one or more employees in twenty or
more weeks of the year, or with a payroll of at least $1,500 in any
calendar quarter. 20 Each state must cover these employers to qualify
for the federal tax credit. In addition, state laws often provide
coverage for types of workers not within the scope of federal law, for
example, domestic household workers.21 When a state program
meets the federal conditions that qualify its employers for the fed-
eral tax credit, the state also qualifies for federal grants to cover its
program's administrative costs. 22 Although the federal statutes in-
clude general administrative and financial provisions, they also dic-
tate standards of eligibility for unemployment benefits. 23 Federal
law, however, does not specify the length of labor force attachment
or amount of earnings necessary to qualify for state benefits. As a
SATION (1969); W. HABER & M. MURRAY, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE AMERICAN
ECONOMY (1966); R. LESTER, THE ECONOMICS OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION (1962); D.
NELSON, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE, THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE, 1915-1935 (1969); W.E,
UPJOHN INSTITUTE FOR EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH, STRENGTHENING UNEIPLOYMENT INSURANCE:
PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS (1975) (reprinted in Hearings on Unemployment Compensation, supra
note 1, at 392); W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE FOR EMPLOYMENT RESEARCH, UNEMPLOYMENT AND
INCOME SECURITY: GOALS FOR THE 1970s (1969); Wittee, Development of Unemployment Compen-
sation, 55 YALE L.J. 21 (1945).
17 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3301.
"s Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
'9 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3306.
20 Id. § 3306(a).
21 Domestic service is specifically excluded by federal law. Id. § 3306(c)(2). Four states,
however, presently offer unemployment compensation coverage for domestic household
workers: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1103(i)(6)(B) (Supp. 1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 46-301(b)(1)(F)
(Supp. 1975); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 383-7(2) (1968); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 560(1) (McKinney
1965).
22 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3302-03.
23 Id. §§ 3304-06.
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result, states have enacted varying eligibility requirements designed
to limit access to their programs.24
Federal law also permits states to specify the amount and dura-
tion of regular benefits. All states provide a potential duration of
regular benefits of at least twenty-six weeks; 25 nine states offer
benefits of longer duration, ranging from twenty-eight to thirty-six
weeks. 26 But there is wide variation in the actual duration of regular
benefits. Eight states provide the maximum for all claimants who
qualify under a uniform duration system. 27 The remaining states
make it more difficult to receive the maximum of twenty-six weeks
by using variable duration systems. 28 Twenty-six weeks of benefits
have generally been regarded as providing sufficient protection for
the majority of unemployed workers in normal economic periods, 29
The federal unemployment tax of 3.2 percent applies to the
first $4,200 earned by each employee in a given year. 30 Revenues
raised by the federal tax are used to defray administrative costs of
state programs and to finance the federal share of extended ben-
efits.31 When revenues exceed the amount needed to cover these
costs, the excess is transferred to a federal trust fund from which the
states may draw when their reserves are exhausted. 32
24 See generally lB CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. 1940-60 (1975).
25 See generally id. 1935.
26 The following states offer regular benefits beyond 26 weeks: Alaska (28), District of
Columbia (34), Iowa (39), Louisiana (28), Massachusetts (30), New Mexico (30), Pennsylvania
(30), Utah (36), Washington (30), and Wisconsin (34). Id. 3001.
27 These states are: Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Vermont, West Virginia. Id. In the "uniform duration" states, all claimants receive the
same number of weeks of benefits once they meet the state's qualifying requirements. This
concept is founded on the belief that "once a worker achieves 'insured status' he is entitled to
the same income maintenance protection as all other insured workers." Hearings on Unemploy-
ment Compensation, supra note 1, at 60 (statement of Lawrence E. Weatherford).
28 The variable duration systems base the number of weeks of benefits on the individual
worker's experience. The longer the individual has worked or the more he has earned-the
longer the duration of his benefits. Forty-four states have adopted this system of benefit
calculation. Hearings on Unemployment Compensation, supra note 1, at 60-61 (statement of
Lawrence E. Weatherford). See also M. MURRAY, THE DURATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
11-15 (1974). For an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of each duration system
see UPJOHN INSTITUTE, PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS, szupra note 16, at 39-42 (reprinted in Hear-
ings on Unemployment Compensation, supra note 1, at 438,41).
29 M. MURRAY, supra note 28, at vii; UPJOHN INSTITUTE, PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS, supra
note 16, at 39 (reprinted in Hearings on Unemployment Compensation, supra note 1, at 438;
Hearings on Unemployment Compensation 322 (testimony of James H. Tinsley).
30 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3301, 3306(b).
32 Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1970, § 202, 26 U.S.C.
§ 3304 nt. (1970).
32 Id. § 204(e).
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The state tax rates must apply to at least the first $4,200 annu-
ally earned by each employee, although states have increasingly
adopted a higher wage base.33 Each state also has an experience
rating system. This system allows employers to vary their tax rate on
the basis of their experience with unemployment.3 4 It encourages
employer planning and employment stabilization by subjecting
employers whose workers have a high rate of involuntary un-
employment to a higher tax rate. Experience rating is the only
method allowed under federal law whereby an employer may re-
duce his state tax rate below 2.7 percent, the maximum credit
allowed against the federal tax.3 5 State tax rates, however, may




A. Temporary Legislation (1958-1961)
The Temporary Unemployment Compensation Act of 1958
(TUC)3 7 represented the first federal legislative effort to provide
extended benefits in a period of long-term unemployment.3 8 Re-
sponding to the severe recession of that year,3 9 Congress enacted a
33 See, elg., ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.175(c) (Gum. Supp. 1975) ($10,000); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-222(b)(2)(A)(iii) (pamph. 1976) ($6,000); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.548 (1975)
($5,400). See also 1B CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. 3000 (1975) for a tabulation of each state's
taxable wage limits.
31 See 1B CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. 1120 (1975).
35 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3302(c).
3' See, e.g., MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.520 (1975) (6.6%); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 268.06(2), (8),
(22) (1975) (6.0%); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-7(c) (1975) (6.2%); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 108.18(4)
(1974) (6.0%). For a tabulation of each state's tax rate see 1B CCH UNEmPL. INS. REP. 3000
(1975).
11 Pub. L. No. 85-441, 72 Stat. 171.
38 President Eisenhower, in a message to Congress, advocated adoption of the first
federal extended benefits program:
Workers and their families should be enabled temporarily to receive weekly benefits
for a longer period than is now in effect so that in the current economic situation
they and their families can obtain a greater measure of economic security.
These recommendations reflect my strong conviction that we must act
promptly, emphatically, and broadly to temper the hardship being experienced by
workers whose unemployment has been prolonged.
H.R. Doc. No. 358, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958).
39 The number of exhaustions of state benefit rights nationwide had risen from
1,191,000 in 1957 (22.7% of all beneficiaries) to 2,599,000 in 1958 (31.0% of all bene-
ficiaries). Hearings on H.R. 3864 and H.R. 3865 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
87th Cong., Ist Sess., table 14, at 31 (1961).
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voluntary program that allowed participating states to draw interest-
free loans from the United States Treasury in order to finance thir-
teen weeks of extra unemployment benefits. 40 During the program's
duration,41 seventeen states participated, 42 borrowing $445.7 million
from the Treasury.43
The temporary benefits provided assistance to a significant
number of unemployed workers and also aided the economy by
maintaining a high level of consumer purchasing power. 44 TUC's
repayment provision, however, imposed a great financial burden on
the participating states; they were required to repay the Treasury by
November 10, 1963. 4 5 Due to the period of only limited recovery
following the 1958 recession 46 and the increased financial pressure
on the states' trust funds resulting from the 1961 recession,4 7 it
40 The average weekly benefit amount of the extended benefits was $30.41. The aver-
age duration of benefits was 9.9 weeks. Id. table 2, at 83.
41 The law became effective June 19, 1958, and was to expire Mar. 31, 1959. In March
of that year Congress enacted legislation that extended the program for another three
months. Act of Mar. 31, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-7, 73 Stat. 14, amending TUG, Pub. L. No.
85-441, § 101(a), 72 Stat. 171.
42 These states were: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Delaware, District of Co-
lumbia, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. Five of the nonparticipating states
independently enacted temporary programs of their own along lines similar to the federal
law: Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Ohio, Wisconsin. Altogether, the 22 states with tempo-
rary programs included 71.2% of the workers covered by state unemployment compensation
systems. Hearings on H.R. 3864 and H.R. 3865, supra note 39, at 82.
43 Id. at 38.
44 In his testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee, Secretary of Labor
Goldberg filed a report stating:
Although it is not possible to gage precisely the effect of these additional millions
of dollars entering the economy through the temporary programs, it seems fair to
say that the total contribution of these benefits was not insignificant. Moreover, they
had the added virtue of being injected into the purchasing power stream through
the hands of people who were among those most in need of such additional
finances.
Id. at 77-78.
45 Failure to meet that deadline would have resulted in state employers losing a partial
credit against their federal unemployment tax. The credit obtainable by an employer against
this tax for 1963 would have been reduced by 0.15%, and by another 0.15% for each
succeeding year until the amount outstanding was restored. Such a reduction in the allow-
able credit would have had the effect of increasing the net federal unemployment tax (federal
tax minus allowable state credit) in the first year of its operation to 0.45% and in the second
year the tax would have been increased to 0.6%. This increase in yearly tax would have
continued until the debt to the federal government was repaid. TUG, Pub. L. No. 85-441,
§ 104(a), 72 Stat. 171.
46 Exhaustion of regular state benefits, although declining from its 1958 peak, con-
tinued at a high level for 1959 (1,703,000, 30.6% of all beneficiaries) and 1960 (1,604,000,
26.05% of all beneficiaries). Hearings on H.R. 3864 and H.R. 3865, supra note 39, at 31.
47 Exhaustion of regular state benefits increased greatly in 1961 to 2,400,000 (30.4% of
all beneficiaries). SENATE COMM., supra note 7, at 24.
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became evident that no participating state would be able to reim-
burse the Treasury by that deadline.48 As a result, Congress was
forced to enact legislation 49 that allowed employers to avoid in-
creased taxation by establishing a system of partial repayments on an
installment basis. 50 Unfortunately, certain states were unable to
meet even this standard 5' and some continued to repay the Trea-
sury through 1966.52
Faced with another recession and with increasing numbers of
jobless workers exhausting their unemployment benefits, 53 in 1961
Congress again enacted temporary legislation, the Temporary Ex-
tended Unemployment Compensation Act of 1961 (TEUC), to deal
with the problem bf long-term unemployment. 54 For a number of
reasons it structured TEUC along lines different from TUC: first,
too few states had participated in the TUC program; 55 second, very
few states had enacted their own extended benefits programs 56 and
few were capable of doing so in the near future;57 and third, TUC's
financing and repayment provisions had been a disaster. 58 To secure
4s The House Ways and Means Committee estimated that all 17 states would be repay-
ing loans through 1964, with 11 continuing through 1965, and four completing payment in
1966. Hearings on H.R. 3864 and H.R. 3865, supra note 39, table 25, at 38.
4' Act of Nov. 7, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-173, 77 Stat. 305.
50 This provision continues in effect, codified in 26 U.S.C. § 3302(c)(2) (1970). The
annual installment for a state is set at 0.15% of state taxable wages for the previous year,
adjusted to the federal limit on taxable wages. Id.
51 States failing to meet yearly installment deadlines are penalized by an effective increase
in the federal unemployment tax rate. Id. See also S. REP. No. 629, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1963).
52 Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia continued repayment through
1966. For a further description of TUC's financing difficulties see H. MALISOFF, THE FINANC-
ING OF EXTENDED UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 7-10 (1963).
53 See note 46 supra.
51 Pub. L. No. 87-6, 75 Stat. 8.
55 See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
5' The Senate Finance Committee, in its report on the TEUG legislation, stated:
[T]his second extension of unemployment compensation benefits on a temporary
basis is justified because generally the States have not dealt with the special problems
involved in periods of protracted and high unemployment. In the case of those States
that have established special provisions to meet the unusual circumstances that arise
in a recessionary period, there has not been sufficient time to demonstrate the
effectiveness of these programs. It is the hope of the commiffee that more States will
act to deal effectively with the special problems imposed on the Federal-State un-
employment compensation program so that the need for Federal action during times
of recession can be alleviated.
S. REP. No. 69, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1961).
57 The Senate Finance Committee also reported that "[flor the most part State un-
employment compensation programs at the present time are not designed to deal with
long-term recession-created unemployment and the protracted period of seeking reemploy-
ment that typically exists in time of recession." Id. at 3.
58 See notes 47-52 and accompanying text supra.
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universal participation by the states in the extended benefits pro-
gram, Congress financed TEUC by a general increase in the federal.
unemployment tax of 0.4 percent for 1962 and 1963.59 Although
participation in the program was voluntary, this provision had the
effect of inducing allstates to take part because employers had to
pay for the program whether or not the state decided to participate.
Congressional logic proved irresistible and state participation was
unanimous. 60
Under TEUC, 2.8 million people received $817 million in ben-
efits. 61 The unemployed who exhausted their regular state benefits
were entitled to one-half of their regular benefit amount during the
additional weeks of coverage, and the maximum duration of cover-
age for both federal and state programs was thirty-nine weeks. 62
TEUC also established in the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund a
federal extended benefits account 3 through which all payments
were pooled. 64 Originally, Congress had provided that excess rev-
enues derived from the increased tax rate would be transferred
back to the states.65 But when the Kennedy Administration pro-
jected that revenues would exceed payments by more than $174
million,66 Congress reduced the tax increase in 1963 to 0.25 per-
cent. 67 The pooling of funds at the federal level resulted in total
state participation and provided a satisfactory system of repayment.
TEUC therefore represented an important legislative development
59 This legislation increased the net federal unemployment tax from 0.3% to 0.7% on the
existing wage base of $3,000 for those two years. TEUC, Pub. L. No. 87-6, § 14(a), 75-Stat. 8,as
amended, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3301.
6o The method of pooled financing was also attractive to the states because it avoided the
TUC experience, where each state was required to bear its costs in the program individually.
P. MACKIN, EXTENDED UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 8 (1965).
61 This represented a coverage increase of 0.8 million people and a payment increase of
$217 million above all the extended programs in 1958-1959. Id. at 9.
62 States that paid regular unemployment benefits beyond 26 weeks were reimbursed by
the federal government for the additional weeks, a reimbursement that totalled $46.3 million.
H. MALISOFF, supra note 52, at 11.
' TEUC, Pub. L. No. 87-6, § 13, 75 Stat. 8, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1105 (1970 & Supp.
IV, 1974).
64 These funds were transferred from the United States Treasury as repayable, interest-
free loans. The 0.4% increase in the federal unemployment tax rate went into this account,
and was the means by which the Treasury was repaid. Id.
65 Excess funds were to be distributed to the states in proportion to their wages subject to
taxation. Id.
66 S. REP. No. 174, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1963).
67 This action reduced the net federal unemployment tax for 1963 from 0.7% to 0.45%.
At the end of that year, the net tax returned to 0.3%. Act of May 29, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-31,
§ 2(a), 77 Stat. 51, as amended, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3301.
1976]
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because it recognized for the first time that long-term unemploy-
ment at high levels is a national responsibility. 6 8
B. The Permanent Extended Benefits Program
The Federal-State Extended Unemployment Compensation
Act of 1970 (F-SEUC)6 9 created the first and only permanent sys-
tem of extended unemployment benefits. Still in operation today,
the program assures, in addition to existing state benefits lasting at
least twenty-six weeks, a potential maximum of thirteen weeks of
benefits to the long-term unemployed during recessionary periods.70
Nationwide extended benefits trigger "on" when the insured un-
employment rate71 is 4.5 percent or more for three consecutive
months.72 States can individually trigger "on" when they have an
insured unemployment rate of four percent for a period of thir-
teen weeks, provided that this rate is at least 120 percent of the
average unemployment rate for the same thirteen week period in
the two previous years. 73 The thirteen weeks of extended benefits
are financed equally by the federal government and the states. The
federal unemployment tax was 'raised from an effective rate of 0.4
percent to 0.5 percent, 74 and the wage base from $3,000 to
$4,200, 75 to cover the federal costs of the program.
" For a further analysis of TEUC's scope in providing benefits, see P. MACKIN, supra
note 60, at 9-25.
69 Pub. L. No. 91-373, tit. II, 84 Stat. 695 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 26, 52
U.S.C.).
70 There is a limit of 39 weeks on combined regular and extended benefits. Therefore, if
a state provides 30 weeks of regular benefits (see note 26 supra), only nine weeks of extended
benefits are available. F-SEUC §§ 202(a)-(b)(1)(C), 26 U.S.C. § 3304 nt. (1970).
71 A trigger system was first proposed by the 'Kennedy Administration in 1961. H.R.
7640, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). The triggers were to be subject to presidential discretion,
rather than rigid indicators. 107 CONG. REc. 10,396 (1961) (remarks of Representative King).
The insured unemployment rate refers only to those workers whose employment is insured by
unemployment compensation. As a "rule of thumb, a 4 percent unemployment rate among
insured workers is the equivalent of a 6 percent unemployment rate of the entire work force."
N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.).
72 F-SEUC, § 203(d)(1), 26 U.S.C. § 3304 nt. (1970). When the national insured un-
employment rate drops below 4.5% for three consecutive months, benefits trigger "off." Id.
§ 203(d)(2).
" Id. § 203(e)(1). Once either of these requirements is no longer present, the state is
triggered "off." Id. § 203(e)(2). States may receive F-SEUC benefits, however, when the
national trigger is "on," regardless of whether the state trigger is "on" or "off." It would be
possible therefore for a state with an unemployment rate of 1.0% to receive F-SEUC benefits
because the national unemployment rate was above 4.5% for the required period.
71 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6157(b) (amendment added by Act of Aug. 10, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-373, § 101(b)(2), 84 Stat. 695). The tax rate was temporarily raised to .58% in
1973. Id.
75 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3306(b)(1) (amendment added by Act of Aug. 10, 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-373, § 302, 84 Stat. 695).
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C. Temporary Legislation (1971-1975)
During the 1971 recession, there was a sharp rise in the
number of workers exhausting regular7 6 and F-SEUC benefits. 77
To cope with this problem, Congress enacted the Emergency Un-
employment Compensation Act of 1971 (EUC 1971).78 This Act
provided an extra thirteen weeks of benefits, making the potential
duration of all benefits fifty-two weeks: twenty-six weeks of state
benefits, thirteen weeks of F-SEUC benefits, and thirteen weeks of
EUC 1971 benefits. Two situations triggered the extra benefits
"on" in a state: first, when the insured unemployment rate plus the
average rate of those exhausting regular benefits was greater than
6.5 percent for a thirteen week period, or second, when there was a
state or national "on" indicator for F-SEUC extended benefits, or
there had been an indicator of this kind during the previous year
and the state met the F-SEUC state trigger criteria without regard
to the 120 percent requirement.7 9 EUC 1971, slated to be operative
in the first six months of 1972,80 was financed completely from the
federal unemployment account with funds raised by the federal
unemployment tax.8 '
Nineteen states participated in this emergency extended ben-
efits program.82 When the national trigger under F-SEUC went
"off" in March 1972, seventeen states immediately triggered "on"
for EUC 1971 benefits.83 As the program continued, many states
received benefits under EUC 1971, even though their F-SEUC
76 The number of persons who had exhausted regular benefits rose from 1.3 million in
1970 (24.4% of all beneficiaries), to 2.0 million in 1971 (30.5% of all beneficiaries). SENATE
COMM., supra note 7, at 24.
7 See 118 CONG. REc. 22,991 (1972) (remarks of Representative Burke).
78 Pub. L. No. 92-224, tit. II, 85 Stat. 810.
79 For an analysis of the 120% requirement see notes 137-44 and accompanying text
infra.
80 Congress, faced with the prospect of 300,000 to 400,000 workers exhausting all of
their benefits before the end of 1972, extended the life of EUC 1971 through 1972. Act of
June 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-329, § 1, 86 Stat. 398, amending EUC 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-224,
§ 202(f), 85 Stat. 810. To finance this further extension, Congress increased the federal un-
employment tax by 0.08%. Act of June 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-329, § 2(a), 86 Stat. 398, as
amended, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 3301.
sI Under this legislation, the amounts paid to any state for EUC 1971 benefits were
repaid by the Treasury's general funds. The transfers were made from the amounts that
would otherwise have been paid over to a state out of excess federal unemployment tax
collections. EUC 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-224, § 204, 85 Stat. 810.
82 An analysis of each state's experience under EUC 1971 is presented in U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, REPORT ON EXPERIENCE UNDER THE EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION ACT
OF 1971, As AMENDED, SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 12-54 (1973).
83 Id. Eight of these states would not have qualified if the 120% requirement had been in
force.
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benefits had triggered "off." When benefits were finally terminated
in March 1973, the number of states qualifying for EUC 1971
benefits, which had dropped to three at the end of 1972, had risen
to ten.
8 4
Confronted in 1974 with an increasing rate of unemploy-
ment8 5 and benefit exhaustion, 86 Congress again found it necessary
to supplement the F-SEUC program to aid the long-term un-
employed. 87 The Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of
1974 (EUC 1974),88 structured along the same lines as EUC 1971,
was enacted as a temporary measure to provide an extra thirteen
weeks of extended benefits, 89 making available a total of fifty-two
weeks of benefits. EUC 1974 changed the requirements for the
F-SEUC national trigger by allowing states the option of individu-
ally lowering the indicator level from 4.5 to four percent for the
permanent extended benefits. 90 For the additional thirteen weeks
of temporary extended benefits, the national trigger was set at four
percent. States that elected the optional trigger level and chose to
participate in EUC 1974 would therefore have both the extended
and emergency benefits trigger "on" at the same time.9' EUC 1974
84 Id.
85 The total unemployment rate rose from 4.9% to 5.6% in 1974, while the insured
unemployment rate rose from 2.8% to 3.6%. SENATE COMM., supra note 7, at 23.
8 The number of persons who had exhausted regular benefits rose from 1.5 million in
1973 (27.6% of all beneficiaries), to 1.9 million in 1974 (30.9% of all beneficiaries). The
number of exhaustions of F-SEUC extended benefits went from 36,000 in Jan.-Mar. 1974 to
149,000 in Apr.-June 1974. Id. at 24, 27.
87 Representative Ullman, in reporting to the House on the need for emergency un-
employment compensation legislation, stated:
Every Member of the House is well aware, I am sure, that unemployment has
increased significantly in recent months, rising to 6.5 percent in November, the
highest monthly rate of unemployment that has occurred in 13 years. Under a
realistic appraisal of the present conditions of the national economy, it is expected
that unemployment will continue at a high level for many months to come. It is
quite obvious, therefore, that we need to act to augment the existing unemployment
compensation programs so that the needs of the long-term unemployed workers
will be met.
120 CONG. REC. H 11,693 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1974).
88 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304 nt. (Supp. 1976) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 93-572, 88 Stat.
1869).
89 The EUC 1974 program provides emergency benefits that will terminate on Mar. 31,
1977. EUC 1974, § 102(f)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304 nt. (Supp. 1976).
90 F-SEUC § 203(d), 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304 nt. (Supp. 1976) (amendment added by EUC
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-572, § 107, 88 Stat. 1869).
91 For states that did not lower the trigger level for F-SEUC benefits, the mandatory
national trigger went "on" Feb. 2, 1975. It was estimated that both benefit programs would
be in effect in all states for most of 1975 without regard to the optional trigger level. SENATE
COMM., supra note 7, at 8. It is possible that some state legislatures could not meet in time to
take advantage of the option to lower the trigger level. Of course, once the national trigger
went "on" this was of no consequence.
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also continued the EUC 1971 modification of the state trigger,
requiring a four percent insured unemployment rate for a thirteen
week period, without regard to the original 120 percent require-
ment of F-SEUC. 92 The. emergency benefits were financed from
the federal unemployment account, with loans from general re-
venues available to cover shortages. 93
In 1975, facing a continued economic decline 94 and predic-
tions of high exhaustion rates for EUC 1974 benefits,95 Congress
amended EUC 197496 by adding an additional thirteen weeks of
emergency benefits, making available a total of sixty-five weeks of
benefits through June 30, 1975. 91 Congress financed these extra
thirteen weeks in the same manner as EUC 1974.91 The un-
employment situation, however, remained _critical, with over one
million unemployed workers facing benefit exhaustion before the
end of 1975. 99 Congress therefore responded by continuing the
.twenty-six week total of EUC 1974 emergency benefits through the
end of 1975 in the Emergency Compensation and Special Un-
employment Assistance Extension Act (EC 1975).100 Under this
Act, a state's insured unemployment rate determines the state's
.eligibility for continued emergency extended benefits. 101
92 F-SEUC, § 203(e)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304 nt. (Supp. 1976) (amendment added by EUG
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-572, § 106, 88 Stat..1869). See notes 73, 79 and accompanying textsupra.
93 EUC 1974, § 104, 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304 nt. (Supp. 1976).
94 At the time EUC 1974 was amended in 1975, unemployment was at 8.2% and the
Gross National Product was $200 billion below its potential. S. REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1975).
" Congress has projected that 100,000 unemployed workers will exhaust EUC 1974
benefits in Jan.-Mar. 1975, with the number peaking at 400,000 in Oct.-Mar. 1976. SENATE
COMM., supra note 7, at 27.
" Tax Reduction Act of 1975, § 701(a), amending EUC 1974, § 102(e), 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 3304 nt. (Supp. 1976).
97 The additional 13 weeks were made available through June 30, 1975. Id. At that
point, benefits were available for 26 weeks under the original state plans, 13 weeks under
F-SEUC, and 26 weeks under EUC 1974, making the total benefit package cover a maximum
of 65 weeks.
8 See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
99 Representative Corman argued on the floor of the House that the bill was necessary
to alleviate the critical unemployment situation: "Over a million unemployed workers could
exhaust unemployment benefits by the end of this year unless these extensions are enacted."
121 CONG. REC. H 6253 (daily ed. June 26, 1975).
100 EC 1975, § 101(f), amending EUC 1974, § 102(e)(3), 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304 nt. (Supp.
1976). The original legislation, H.R. 6900, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), provided for the 26
weeks of emergency benefits to be extended to June 30, 1976. The extension, however, was
reduced in conference to six months. H.R. REP. No. 328; 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975).
101 If a state's insured unemployment rate is more than 5.0% but less than 6.0% for a
13-week period, then the maximum duration of benefits will be 52 weeks, or emergency
benefits of 13 weeks. Ifa state's insured unemployment rate is more than 6.0% for a 13-week
period, then the maximum duration of benefits will be 65 weeks, or emergency benefits of
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This latest enactment alters the general eligibility requirements
for emergency benefits. Formerly, compliance with state eligibility
standards and exhaustion of the permanent state and federal ben-
efits was sufficient to qualify for emergency benefits. EC 19,75,
however, requires that persons unemployed more than thirty-nine
weeks must register for job training, if they are not already par-
ticipating in a training program.' 0 2 This requirement was enacted
without a commensurate increase in federal training programs and
the administrative burden is therefore on the individual states.' 0 3
The financial provision of EC 1975 is similar to previous
emergency benefit programs-the federal unemployment account
supplies funds provided by the federal employer tax.' 0 4 EC 1975
also lengthens the period in which states may repay the loans they
secure to pay the increasing number of workers drawing state ben-
efits and to finance the state share of F-SEUC costs. 10 5 The re-
payment date was formerly January 1, 1975, but it has been ex-
tended to January 1, 1978. This extension, however, is conditioned
upon the Secretary of Labor finding that the state has taken ap-
propriate action to restore the fiscal soundness of its unemploy-
ment trust fund.10
6
As this description illustrates, the current extended benefits
system does not adequately solve the problem of long-term un-
employment. It does not provide sufficient job training for those
26 weeks. EC 1975, §§ 101(b), (g), amending EUC 1974, § 102(e), 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304 nt. (Supp.
1976).
102 Id. § 103, amending EUC 1974, § 102(g), 26 U.S.C. § 3304 nt. (Supp. 1976).
103 Senator Harrison Williams, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, denounced this requirement as an ineffective measure, stating that "[a]s this provi-
sion is implemented by state officials, persons unemployed for more than 39 weeks will be
told to register for job training, even when no training opportunities exist[,]" and he ob-
served that "a significant increase in Federal manpower training programs will be necessary,
unless jobs are created to absorb a substantial portion of the unemployed, reducing the
unemployfnent compensation rolls and the job training that now attaches to them." N.Y.
Times, Aug. 6, 1975, at 34, col. 4 (city ed.).
104 EC 1975, § 102(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304 nt. (Supp. 1976).
105 Failure to repay these loans on time results in a penalty. This penalty takes the form
of a loss of employer credit against the federal unemployment tax. The federal tax credit is
reduced by 10% for each year in which the state is delinquent in its repayment. Id. § 110, 26
U.S.C.A. § 3304 nt. (Supp. 1976), amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3302(c)(3).
106 Appropriate action refers to an increase in the unemployment tax rate or base, or an
alteration in the state's experience rating formula to increase substantially the revenues
raised by the state unemployment tax. Representative Corman, in his analysis of this provi-
sion, thought that Connecticut's raising of its tax base from $4,200 to $6,000 and its solvency
tax rate from 0.9% to 1.0%, represented such appropriate action. (A solvency tax is the
incremental tax added to each employer's tax rate to ensure that the state's unemployment
trust fund remains solvent.) 121 CONG. REC. H 6254 (daily ed. June 26, 1975).
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with little prospect of returning to their former or similar jobs, nor
does it adequately place a limit on employer responsibility for ex-
tended benefits. Moreover, the trigger mechanism does not effec-
tively respond to periods of economic recession. Finally, the cur-
rent system is financially unsound-neither the federal government
nor the states presently have adequate reserves to pay existing
levels of benefits. The final section of this Note will therefore
suggest alternatives to the present system and methods for restruc-
turing it.
III
PROPOSALS FOR LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT RELIEF
A. Alternatives to Extended Benefits
The underlying principle of the unemployment compensation
system is that an insured worker, by right of his employment, is
entitled to benefits for transitional periods of unemployment.' 0 7
The present system, however, does not adequately meet the needs of
long-term unemployed workers. The question, therefore, is whether
the federal extended benefits program is the correct tool for coping
with this economic problem. To analyze this issue, suggested alter-
natives to the program must be examined.
1. Retraining
Unemployment lasting longer than six to nine months is often
due to structural changes in the economy reflecting technological
advances and permanent demand shifts.10 8  During regular
economic periods, long-term unemployment usually results from
either over-specialization, which makes a worker's employment pos-
sible only in periods of high demand, or else from a permanent
decline in the need for his specific skill.109 A recent study also
107 5 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Docs. 955 (1969).
108 See, e.g., W. HABER, THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 2-49 (1963); W. HABER
& M. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 14-19; P. MACKIN, supra note 60, at 26-27; H. MALISOFF,
supra note 52, at 46; M. MURRAY, supra note 28, at 65-66; UPJOHN INSTITUTE, PROGRAM
IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 16, at 47-48 (reprinted in Hearings on Unemployment Compensation,
supra note 1, at 446-48); Burns, New Guidelines for Unemployment Insurance, 29 EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY REV. 5 (1962).
109 Dr. Eveline M. Burns, a leading authority on unemployment insurance and public
welfare, has distinguished between several types of long-term unemployment:
It may be recession unemployment, affecting workers in a wide variety of occupa-
tions and industries, for whom the presumption is that, once the economy revives,
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suggests that those who remain unemployed longer than six months
usually do not have a significant prospect of returning to their
original job 10 Such unemployment, therefore, is not transitional
thq vast majority of unemployed will be reabsorbed in their previous types of
activity. Or it may be due to a permanent decline in demand for the type of skill or
occupation of the worker. Examples of this type of unemployment are the un-
employed in depressed areas or workers whose jobs have become extinct due to
technological change. Here there is no presumption of reabsorption in the old job
even if the economy as a whole is in a state of full employment. A change of
occupation, perhaps even acceptance of a lower paid type of work, and sometimes a
change of place of employment is necessary for reemployment. Finally, there is a
type of long-term unemployment which is due to the fact that certain workers
possess characteristics that in the current state of employers' preferences make
them unacceptable for employment.
Burns, supra note 108, at 5.
In, 1966-67, Pennsylvania conducted the most recent and most useful post-
exhaustion study. COMMONWEALTH OF PEN'NSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND INDUSTRY,
LABOR FORCE AND CLAIM STATUS OF WORKERS DURING THE TWELVE MONTHS FOLLOWING
EXHAUSTION OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BENEFITS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1966-1967
(1970). Unfortunately, the lack of other research in this area tends to limit the impact of the
Pennsylvania study's conclusions concerning unemployed workers who return to the labor
(orce. The study, however, does present significant findings regarding reemployment.
The Pennsylvania study focused for 12 months on 11,511 unemployed workers who
exhausted their benefits for the months of May-Oct. 1966. The jobless received from 18 to 30
weeks of benefits under Pennsylvania's variable duration system of unemployment compensa-
tion (see note 28 supra). During the period of study (1966,67), Pennsylvania had low rates of
insured unemployment (1.9 to 2.3%), and therefore opportunities for reemployment were
available.
The study revealed a sharp decline in those successfully returning to work after a period
of 28 weeks of unemployment. The reemployment rate, within two months of exhaustion of
benefits, for those unemployed up to 28 weeks was 43.0%. The reemployment rate for those
unemployed from 25 to 28 weeks was 43.2%. For those out of work over 29 weeks, however,
the reemployment rate dropped to 25.1%. This reemployment figure continued to diminish
until, after 51 weeks of uneuaployment, only 18.5% returned to work. PENNSXLVANIA STUDY,
supra, at appendix table F-6.
These statistics have evoked proposals that all states provide 39 weeks of regular benefits
to provide for those who cannot find ajob even in periods of low unemployment. In fact, both
a Nixon Administration task force composed of cabinet-level officials and the Labor Depart-
ment's Manpower Administration studied a proposal for a federal standard requiring all states
to extend their benefit programs to provide a maximum of 39 weeks of regular benefits. See
Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies, Highlights of First Meeting of
Legislative Committee (March 7-8, 1973); Unemployment Benefit Advisors, Inc., The Advisor
(March 1973); both cited in M. MURRAY, supra note 28, at 26. Under this proposal, the federal
government would have paid for half of a state's cost for benefits lasting longer than 26 weeks.
The issue of how to finance the federal share of these costs, however, was never resolved,
because the Nixon Administration never submitted a program to increase the length of
regular state benefits, although the Interstate Conference Special Committee on Unemploy-
ment Problems, in proposing a similar plan, did suggest that federal costs be financed by an
increase in the federal unemployment tax. Under the Nixon Administration's proposal, an
unemployed worker, as a condition of receiving these benefits, would have been required to
have a greater attachment to the labor force than that required for 26 weeks of benefits. The
Interstate Conference proposed that for 39 weeks of benefits a worker would be required to
have worked 50% longer than the standard for 26 weeks of benefits.
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and does not fit the situations that unemployment compensation is
designed to ameliorate.11 '
Nine states currently provide regular benefits for periods longer than 26 weeks (see note
26supra). But there would be many problems in requiring all states to establish uniformly 39
weeks of regular benefits. Such a proposal would both extend the financial responsibility of
employers beyond what it should be (see notes 125-36 and accompanying textinfra), and would
not be in the best interests of the unemployed workers, who would be better served by a
manpower program (see notes 119-24 and accompanying text infra). There would also be a
serious question of whether 39 weeks of regular benefits could be successfully regulated by the
federal government. Federal standards would be necessary to ensure uniform benefit levels
and duration without regard to individual state laws. See W. HABER & M. MURRAY, supra note
16, at 443-46. However justified, proposed federal benefit standards face overwhelming
logistical and political opposition by states that wish to retain control over their benefit
programs. Indeed, such a provision was recently defeated in the House Ways and Means
Committee. 1B CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. 729 (Unemployment Insurance Reports) (1975).
Furthermore, a federal standard would require states to implement uniform duration
benefits systems (see note 27 supra). Only eight states currently have such systems, and the
trend has been toward the use of variable duration systems. It would therefore be necessary to
alter drastically these variable duration systems in order to allow a substantial number of
unemployed workers to qualify for 39 weeks of benefits. This, however, might conflict with
legitimate state policies concerning the number of workers receiving state benefits, employer
tax rates, and the state's tax base. The issue is further complicated by the different variable
duration systems that would have to be modified to come within the scope of the 39-week
proposal. Uniform duration states, on the other hand, might have to increase their labor force
attachment requirements. Too high an increase, however, would disqualify many workers
who deserve benefits for a shorter duration. M. MURRAY, supra note 28, at 63-64. Moreover,
the political opposition of business groups and state administrators of unemployment com-
pensation systems, successful in blocking proposed federal standards in the past, would be
strongly allied against any fundamental change in the operation of the state systems. See W.
HABER & M. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 445-46; Hearings on Unemployment Compensation, supra
note 1, at 321-24 (testimony of James H. Tinsley, Chamber of Commerce of the United
States).
Finally, additional eligibility requirements would have to be proposed to assure that only
those with a substantial attachment to the labor force were aided. Setting these standards,
however, is extremely difficult. The Kennedy Administration, in legislation advanced in
1961 (H.R. 7640, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961)), proposed that 78 weeks of employment in
the previous three years be required for 13 weeks of extra benefits, with 104 weeks in the
same time period required for 26 weeks of benefits. Subsequent studies have indicated,
however, that these requirements would not be helpful in differentiating between those who
had long-term and those who had slight attachments to the labor force. M. MURRAY, supra
note 28, at 63-64 (1974). The Kennedy bill represented an even greater attachment re-
quirement than the 50% standard proposed by the Interstate Conference, but it would have
had little effect in making fair distinctions. No proposal has therefore been made which
successfully screens out those with low attachments and provides the longer regular benefits
to workers with long-term attachments.
11' Dr. Burns, in her analysis, concluded that "unemployment insurance is peculiarly
well-suited to meet needs for income during periods of short-run unemployment." Burns,
supra note 108, at 8. She also warned of misusing the unemployment insurance concept:
[The important point is that for these types of workers (the long-term un-
employed) unemployment insurance is not the most appropriate form of social
provision. We may find ourselves using unemployment insurance to meet the in-
come needs of such people because at the moment nothing else is available, but we
should recognize that in doing so we are bowing to an inadequacy of social planning
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Reimbursement for income loss does not meet the needs of the
long-term unemployed who seek to return to the labor force. These
workers need retraining, relocation, counseling, and other sup-
port.1 12 It is for this reason that income maintenance paid beyond
the limit of the present federal and state systems "should be as-
sociated with and available only in conjunction with participation in
these adjustment processes and should not be financed by un-
employment insurance taxes."'1' Manpower services would effec-
tively respond to the conditions causing long-term unemployment
by shifting retrained workers into areas of the economy that need
skilled manpower. Such programs would also give the most support
to those workers wishing to return to the labor force." 4
The retraining provision in EC 1975 is a step in this direction.
Congress, however, enacted the job-training requirement without a
commensurate increase in federal training programs. 115 Con-
and may well be endangering the integrity of unemployment insurance itself. For as
this social invention is stretched to meet inappropriate problems, there is a danger
that modifications will be introduced for the "extended benefits" and these may
later be transferred to "normal benefits." Herein lies the danger, for example, of
proposals to distinguish between the primary and the secondary wage earner in
extended benefits.
Id. at 9.
112 See B. BLAUSTEIN,Supra note 16, at 9-10; W. HABER, SUpra note 108, at 22-23, 29-43;
W. HABER & M. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 476-78; M. MURRAY, supra note 28, at 64-65;
UPJOHN INSTITUTE, PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 16, at 47-49 (reprinted in Hearings
on Unemployment Compensation, supra note 1, at 446-48). See generally Somers, Training the
Unemployed, in IN AID OF THE UNEMPLOYED 227 (J. Becker ed. 1965).
In recent testimony before the House Unemployment Compensation Subcommittee, an
AFL-CIO representative urged Congress to institute for the long-term jobless, "a com-
prehensive program of job counseling, training, retraining, upgrading of skills, rehabilita-
tion services if needed, relocation assistance if desired, and job placement." Hearings on
Unemployment Compensation, supra note 1, at 295 (testimony of Bert Seidman, Director, De-
partment of Social Security, AFL-CIO).
113 UPJOHN INSTITUTE: PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS, supra note 16, at 42 (reprinted in
Hearings on Unemployment Compensation, supra note 1, at 441). A guaranteed minimum income
program might be an attractive alternative to extended benefits, and a method of augment-
ing manpower programs. A study of the impact of such a program concluded, however, that
very few workers drawing regular benefits would be aided by the different plans proposed to
date. M. MURRAY, THE ROLE OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE UNDER GUARANTEED MINIMUM
INCOME PLANS 18-24, 39-41 (1969). This conclusion was based on the inadequate level of
income proposed. If a sufficient income level were provided, those who exhaust up to 52
weeks of benefits would be helped by a guaranteed income plan. M. MURRAY, supra note 28,
at 68. Unfortunately, congressional resistance to guaranteed income plans is formidable, and
it is not realistic to presume that such a program will be forthcoming in the near future. See
N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 5 (city ed.). See also D. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A
GUARANTEED INCOME: THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION AND THE FAMILY ASSISTANCE PLAN
(1973).
'14 See Burns,supra note 108, at 7-9; UPJOHN INSTITUTE, PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS, supra
note 16, at 45-46 (reprinted in Hearings on Unemployment Compensation, supra note 1, at
444-45).
'Is See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 61:823
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
sequently, many people will register for state programs that, because
of a lack of state funds to support new programs, do not exist.116
Furthermore, by leaving implementation to state officials, there is no
guarantee that state training programs will be created to deal with
the increasing number of workers exhausting benefits after thirty-
nine weeks." 7 Congress should take the initiative in this area by
placing retraining programs under complete federal control, and by
imposing uniform standards on state programs before they are
funded."" Retraining and income subsidies are more likely to al-
leviate the causes of long-term unemployment than is reliance on
the unemployment compensation system alone.
2. Public Works
The current system has not functioned well under the strain of
providing sixty-five weeks of income maintenance because un-
employment compensation is designed principally to provide for the
transitionally unemployed.' 19 However, workers cannot return
quickly to the labor force in recessionary times, regardless of man-
power programs. Therefore, it is necessary to provide some alterna-
tive to the present method of dealing with recessionary unemploy-
ment. During these periods, a federally-subsidized public-service
jobs program similar to those created during the New Deal would be
preferable to unemployment benefits extending beyond thirty-nine
weeks. 120 Such a program would relieve unemployment compensa-
tion of the burden of providing for the long-term jobless.
116 See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
117 See note 103 and accompanying text supra.
I'l Such uniform standards might include eligibility requirements, levels of benefits,
types of training available, and duration of training.
" E. Burns, Social Sectrity: What Should it Be?, in THE SOCIAL WELFARE FORUM, 1972, at
110-11 (National Conference on Social Welfare ed. 1974).
120 Id. In a similar vein, Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, has
recently proposed that low wage government jobs be provided as an alternative to extended
unemployment benefits. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1975, at 37, col. 6 (city ed.). In support of
H.R. 5247, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), the Public Works Employment Act, Representative
Hughes also spoke of the need for public work during high unemployment periods:
The principal purpose of this legislation, to create jobs by building public works
projects and wastewater treatment plants, is just what the doctor ordered.
Today this Nation is faced with an unemployment rate of 8 percent, an
intolerable condition to say the least: The administration's response has been to
increase unemployment benefits, but continue to oppose public works projects.
Certainly workers need increased unemployment benefits during this present reces-
sion. More importantly, however, workers want and need jobs. This is what H.R.
5247 does: it takes men and women out of unemployment lines, puts them to work,
and leaves this Nation's localities with improved roads, buildings, recreational areas,
and other public facilities. Unlike simple unemployment payments, this bill leaves
our communities with lasting improvements.
As you know, Mr. Speaker, this legislation is targeted in on areas of high
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Outright public assistance, although an alternative to a public
works program, is not an attractive option.12' For individuals who
have a high attachment to the labor force and are work-oriented, a
public works program would be more useful and productive. 122 It
would provide the unemployed with an opportunity to work and
would give them the dignity of earning a living. A program of public
works might be desirable in all economic periods because some
workers will always exhaust benefits, no matter what their dura-
tion. 2 3 Manpower services, however, are a much better means of
returning unemployed workers to the labor force in nonrecession-
ary times because such programs provide workers with new and
needed skills-the workers then being able to step back into the
regular economy.' 24 A program of public works should therefore be
unemployment. South Jersey is in particular need of such aid, as its unemployment
rate tops the 13.3 percent statewide average with some areas of my district as high
as 26 percent. Among some of the construction trades unemployment approaches
80 percent. Not only will the funds provided by H.R. 5247 directly produce an
estimated 50,000 jobs in New Jersey, but many more jobs in supporting industries
and services will be indirectly created. This policy of directing the funds to areas
which are in greatest need should be commended.
122 CONG. REC. H 476 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1976).
121 As was pointed out by Representative Donald W. Riegle, Jr.:
An increasing number of the unemployed must now turn to the welfare pro-
grams. The accompanying hardship, heartache and humiliation they are experienc-
ing as they become unwilling welfare clients is nothing short of an economic crime.
These working men and women-of all ages and backgrounds-are the innocent
victims of a national economy over which they have virtually no control. They feel a
deep resentment and growing anger that so much of their whole life's work can be
wiped away through no fault of their own. They know full well they are being
forced to accept an unequal economic hardship by deliberate national economic
policies which induced this recession.
Their patience is nearing an end-and I predict that soon they will be march-
ing on Washington in massive numbers to demand new economic policies and
programs that are sensible and just; policies and programs which insure jobs-and
paychecks-for all people able and willing to work.
Hearings on Unemployment Compensation, supra note 1, at 337.
112 A public works program for those eligible for unemployment compensation would
have a significant advantage over a public assistance program because unemployed workers
would not be subjected to a needs test-a characteristic of most welfare programs. Valdemar
Carlson has written that such a test is the "watershed" dividing social insurance from public
assistance. V. CARLSON, ECONOMIC SECURITY IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1962). A program
open only to those who are eligible for unemployment insurance and who have therefore
demonstrated a desire for reemployment, would also be more in keeping with the guidelines
of Social Security and less open to attack as a welfare program. Wilbur Cohen, a former
Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, has written:
The widespread acceptance of Social Security is due in large part to the contribu-
tory earnings-related social-insurance philosophy that emphasizes the work ethic and
individual responsibility and has appealed to both liberals and conservatives, Demo-
crats and Republicans, and individuals in all socio-economic groups.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1975, at 25, col. 4 (city ed.). See also E. Burns, supra note 119, at
110-11.
123 M. MURRAY, supra note 28, at 66.
124 See notes 112-14 and accompanying text supra.
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limited in scope to recessionary periods when manpower programs
are unlikely to be effective.
B. General Revenue Financing
Short-term unemployment has been recognized as the financial
responsibility of employers; long-term unemployment has not.125
Long-term unemployment reflects a widespread economic problem,
rather than a local, employer-related one. Those who have been
unemployed for a long period are victims of technological and
structural changes in the economy that are national in scope and
origin.12 6 Employers should therefore not be forced to pay for
benefits beyond the thirty-nine weeks provided by F-SEUC. Requir-
ing them to do so would ignore the fact that the longer an individual
is unemployed, "the more remote his attachment to a former em-
ployer becomes and the more tenuous the employer's responsibility
for his unemployment."' 27
Increased employer taxes to pay for long-term extended ben-
efits would undercut the experience rating system, 28 a method by
which employers are encouraged to stabilize employment.12 9 The
higher tax rate would have no relation to an employer's unemploy-
ment record, thus defeating the system's purpose and alienating
employer support for unemployment compensation.13 0 In periods
of continuing high unemployment, increased employer taxes would
also exacerbate the general economic problem by reducing money
available for business expansion and investment, key factors for
economic recovery and reemployment.' 3 '
One result of the recent emergency benefit programs, which
have failed to distinguish between responsibility for short and long-
term unemployment, is the current insolvency of the Federal Trust
Fund.13 2 Consequently, Congress has had to advance $2.9 billion
12' See, e.g., Hearings on Unemployment and Compensation, supra note 1, at 321 (testimony
of James T. Tinsley).
126 See notes 108-11 and accompanying text supra.
127 M. MURRAY, supra note 28, at 71.
128 See notes 34-35 and accompanying text supra.
129 See note 35 supra.
1:0 Telephone interview by the author with Michael Romig, Associate Director for
Economic Security, The Chamber of Commerce of the United States, June 12, 1975.
'31 See generally Burns, supra note 108, at 5-9.
'32 This technical insolvency-the Federal Trust Fund's reserves have been exhausted
and benefits have been paid by general revenue funds advanced to the Trust Fund-has
resulted from the numerous federal laws providing more dollar benefits than the employer
taxes could finance. Under the current employer tax structure, it will take several years before
solvency can be attained. See Hearings on Unemployment Compensation, supra note 1, at 63
(statement of Lawrence E. Weatherford, Acting Associate Manpower Administrator for Un-
employment Insurance); id. at 323 (testimony of James T. Tinsley).
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from general revenues in order to continue the payment of benefits
under both the extended and emergency benefit programs.1 33
It is necessary to recognize that long-term unemployment at
high levels is a national responsibility that should be borne by all
taxpayers. In EC 1975,' 34 Congress has partially recognized this
responsibility by providing thirty-nine weeks of benefits for workers
not covered by the unemployment compensation system.135 These
benefits are financed from general revenues. This financing prin-
ciple should be extended to programs that currently place the bur-
den of emergency benefits on employers. Long-term benefit support
is properly a function of public assistance, not employer-financed
unemployment compensation, and any new federal program pro-
viding benefits in addition to the thirteen weeks provided by
F-SEUC should be financed from general revenues. To limit the
burden on employers, short-term unemployment compensation
should provide income maintenance only in periods of transitional
unemployment.
1 3 6
C. State and National Triggers
The triggering mechanism for extended benefits has been
F-SEUC's most controversial provision, 13 7 and its history has dem-
13 See note 12 supra.
134 EC 1975, § 20 1(a), amending Emergency Jobs and Unemployment Assistance Act of
1974, § 206, 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304 nt. (Supp. 1976).
135 The program "provides unemployment compensation to jobless workers who are not
covered under the Federal-State unemployment insurance program, mainly State and local
employees, domestics and farm workers." 121 CONG. REC. H 6254 (daily ed. June 26, 1975)
(remarks of Representative Corman).
136 There is growing support for financing by general revenues. On April 15, 1975, the
Federal Advisory Council, composed of business, labor, and public representatives with
advisory responsibility to the Secretary of Labor, unanimously recommended that after 39
weeks benefits should be financed from federal general revenues, not from increased
employer taxes. William H. Kolberg, Assistant Secretary for Manpower, Memorandum for the
Secretary of Labor (Apr. 18, 1975) (copy on file at the Cornell Law Review).
137 See, e.g., 121 CONG. REC. H 4528-31 (daily ed. May 21, 1975) (remarks of Representa-
tives Pickle, Fisher, Corman, Steiger, and Frenzel). Criticism of triggers has generated a
number of proposals for reform. The most sweeping proposal has advocated that all triggers
be eliminated. UPJOHN INSTITUTE, PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS,supra note 16, at 43-44 (reprinted
in Hearings on Unemployment Compensation, supra note 1, at 442-43); Hearings on Unemployment
Compensation, supra note 1, at 275 (testimony of Bert Seidman, Director, Department of Social
Security, AFL-CIO). The Upjohn study has argued that triggers create arbitrary cut-offs that
do not bear a very "precise relationship to fluctuations in unemployment." UPJOHN INSTITUTE,
PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS, supra, at 43-44, reprinted at 442-43. Regular benefits lasting up to
39 weeks (see note 110 supra), or an AFL-CIO proposal of extended benefits for 26 weeks at
all times have been offered as alternatives. Hearings on Unemployment Compensation, supra note
1, at 275 (testimony of Bert Seidman).
Neither proposal is a viable alternative to the trigger system. The problems in implement-
[Vol. 61:823
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onstrated the need for reform. Since 1972, Congress has had to
modify the state trigger on eight occasions 138 by suspending the 120
percent requirement, so as to provide state workers with needed
benefits. Congress has also temporarily reset the national trigger,13 9
allowing states the option of triggering "on" at an earlier time in
recessionary periods. 140
1. Experience with the State Trigger
The state trigger requirements under F-SEUC allow states to
individually trigger "on" when they have an insured unemployment
rate of four percent for a period of thirteen weeks, provided that the
rate is at least 120 percent of the average unemployment rate for the
same thirteen week period in the two previous years. The 120
percent indicator, however, has been counterproductive of the goal
of extending benefits in times of long-term unemployment, for if a
state has maintained a high level of unemployment over a long
period of time, then the requirement is unlikely to be met.
The difficulties that Alaska encountered demonstrate the gen-
eral problem in this area. Although Alaska experienced an ex-
tremely high unemployment rate throughout 1971 and 1972, it was
precluded from receiving benefits because it failed to meet the 120
percent requirement.' 41 Similarly, when the national trigger for
ing 39 weeks of regular benefits in the majority of states, which use variable duration systems,
have been previously discussed.See note 110 supra. Similarly the AFL-CIO proposal to provide
52 total benefit weeks even in periods of low unemployment faces a number of obstacles. First,
a strong congressional consensus has developed that extended benefits should be payable only
in periods of high-level, long-term unemployment. M. MURRAY,supra note 28, at 57. Second, a
proposed work requirement of 20 weeks in order to receive 52 weeks of benefits has been
criticized as being too limited an attachment to the labor force to justify a benefit duration of
52 weeks. Id. at 59. Third, the proposal incorporates a federal duration standard for regular
benefits, a concept that faces formidable opposition. See note 110 supra.
138 F-SEUC § 203(e), 26 U.S.C. § 3304 nt. (1970), as amended, Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pib.
L. No. 92-599, § 501, 86 Stat. 1324, as amended, Act of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-53, § 3(b), 87
Stat. 134, as amended, Act of Dec. 31, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 20, 87 Stat. 947, as amended,
Act of Mar. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-256, § 2, 88 Stat. 52, as amended, Act of June 30, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 33-329, § 2, 88 Stat. 288, as amended, Act of Aug. 7, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-368, § 3,
88 Stat. 420, as amended, EUC 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-572, § 106, 88 Stat. 1869, as amended, EC
1975, § 102(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 3304 nt. (Supp. 1976).
139 EUC 1974, § 107, amending F-SEUC, § 203(d), 26 U.S.C. § 3304 nt. (1970).
140 See note 90 and accompanying text supra.
141 Alaska triggered "on" for extended benefits in January 1971 and received them until
November of that year. Benefits were terminated at that time because Alaska failed to meet
the 120% requirement, even though it had a 6.8% rate of insured unemployment. Once the
national trigger went "on" in January 1972, Alaska again received extended benefits. When
the national benefits ended in March 1972, however, Alaska, with an insured unemployment
rate of 14.46%, was unable to meet the 120% requirement.
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F-SEUC benefits went "off" in March 1972, of the thirty-eight states
that had insured unemployment rates above four percent, nine were
unable to meet the 120 percent requirement and therefore failed to
qualify for extended benefits. 42 The number of states failing to
qualify increased in the ensuing months, until in July 1972, only four
states were able to meet both the four percent insured unemploy-
ment rate and the 120 percent requirement. 43 Due to the difficul-
ties that states have had in meeting this requirement, Congress has
been forced to suspend it repeatedly, suggesting that Congress
would be wiser to repeal it altogether.1 44 The suspension has re-
cently been continued through March 31, 1977.
2. Area Triggers
In the last session of Congress, it was proposed that area trig-
gers be substituted for state triggers. 45 This proposal represents the
Ford Administration's solution to the state trigger problem. 46 If
implemented, areas with population of 250,000 or more would
receive thirteen weeks of extended benefits when both the national
and area rates of insured unemployment were five percent for a
thirteen week period. An area would receive twenty-six weeks of
142 The following table shows that all nine states had insured unemployment rates in
excess of 6.5%, yet were unable to receive extended benefits because of the 120% require-
ment.
STATE INDICATORS FOR EXTENDED BENEFITS (APR. 1, 1972)
Insured Unemployment Rate
As percent of






North Dakota 7.65 118
Oregon 7.07 96
Rhode Island 7.81 117
Washington 11.46 98
SENATE COMM., supra note 7, at 5.
143 See generally notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra.
144 See note 138 supra.
145 H.R. 6504, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). Under the Administration's proposal, the
triggering mechanism would be keyed to 139 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA)
of more than 250,000 population. Those parts of a state that "lay outside an SMSA of that size
would be treated as a single 'balance of State' area." S. REP. No. 208, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5
(1975).
146 121 CONG. REC. H 4528 (daily ed. May 21, 1975) (remarks of Representative Steiger).
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extended benefits if the area rate were six percent. This proposal
did not receive full legislative scrutiny because Congress rushed to
extend the existing emergency benefits program before it ex-
pired.147 The proposal will receive close congressional attention in
the future,' 48 however, and therefore deserves analysis.
The rationale for an area trigger is that localities may experi-
ence high unemployment when the state as a whole does not. Under
the present F-SEUC system such depressed areas do not qualify for
extended benefits.' 49 Under an area trigger, however, special local
factors, such as seasonal unemployment or a long strike, might
qualify a locality for extended benefits payments. Seasonal workers
tend to have a very low attachment to the labor force and only
short-term patterns of unemployment. 1 5  Their unemployment
tends to be a recurring phenomenon. An extended benefits pro-
gram responsive to this pattern of unemployment would run
counter to the purpose of the extended benefits program, which is
to respond to general periods of high unemployment. 1 1 It would
also be inappropriate to reward long-term strikers with extended
benefits, because unemployment compensation is structured to help
those who are seeking employment, not abstaining from it. 15 2
The Ford Administration's proposal has unsuccessfully at-
147 Id
145 Id. at H 4530 (remarks of Representative Corman).
149 See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
0 W.E. UPJOHN INSTITUTE, PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTS,supra note 16, at 11-14 (reprinted
in Hearings on Unemploymen4 Compensation, supra note 1, at 410-13).
' M. MURRAY, supra note 28, at 54.
15' A federal district court in Hawaii recently restrained the Hawaii Department of Labor
and Industrial Relations from paying unemployment benefits to striking workers. Hawaiian
Tel. Co. v. State Dep't of Labor, IB CCH UNEMPL. INS. REP. 735 (Unemployment Insurance
Reports) (D. Hawaii Nov. 6, 1975). The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had
previously struck down a Rhode Island statute permitting unemployment benefits for striking
workers. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879 (1973).
Although federal policy on this question is not clear, the manner in which Congress has
dealt with the laws of the District of Columbia is instructive. There Congress has excluded
strikers from unemployment benefits. D.C. CODE ANN. § 46-310(f) (1973). The policy of the
Executive branch has also been clear:
The unemployment tax we require employers to pay was never intended to supple-
ment strike funds to be used against them. A worker who chooses to exercise his right
to strike is not involuntarily unemployed.
In two states [New York and Rhode Island, although this is no longer true in
Rhode Island], workers on strike are paid unemployment insurance benefits after a
certain period. This is not the purpose of the unemployment insurance system.
I propose a requirement that this practice of paying unemployment insurance
benefits to workers directly engaged in a strike be discontinued.
Hearings on H.R. 12625 Before the House Conn. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 12
(1969) (letter from President Nixon).
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tempted to surmount these problems by linking the area unem-
ployment rate to the national rate and to an area population
requirement. With the Administration's forecast being that national
unemployment will remain above five percent until 1980,153 the
local unemployment rate would be the only meaningful trigger in
the program. This trigger would be subject to the wide fluctuations
caused by local circumstances and would not be effective. For in-
stance, the area population requirement might result in grave in-
equities to unemployed workers in lightly populated areas,'154 and
the trigger would be too easily influenced in areas that are domi-
nated by a few major industries.' 55 In sum, relating extended ben-
efits to local circumstances would allow special local pressures to
exert too strong an influence upon the program. Area triggers
would also undermine the rationale of the extended benefits pro-
gram, which is to provide benefits in general periods of high un-
employment, not to subsidize failing local economies.
3. Reform of the State Trigger
The state triggering device does not need radical reform to
make it responsive to the needs of the unemployed. The ineffec-
tiveness of the 120 percent requirement has been demonstrated by
the numerous modifications required of it. Since there is little pur-
pose in maintaining an indicator that, in effect, punishes states for
having long periods of high unemployment, 156 Congress should
permanently eliminate it.15 7
The requirement that a four percent insured unemployment
rate exist for thirteen weeks, however, has been a fair and accurate
indicator of long-term unemployment in the states. In May 1975,
153 See note 6 supra.
154 S. REP. No. 208, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975). The Senate Labor and Public
Welfare Committee reported on the impact of H.R. 6504:
Grave inequities would result for unemployed workers in lightly populated
"balance of State" areas. These are pockets of unemployment of 15 percent and
higher where joblessness would remain at drastic levels long after the IUR [insured
unemployment rate] for the State as a whole has receded below 6 percent. The
trigger would activate without respect to the employment experience of 12 million
workers who are not covered by the regular Federal-State unemployment compensa-
tion program and are not, therefore, taken into account in the IUR.
Id.
15S See SUBCOMM. ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS
AND MEANS, 94TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STATISTICAL INFORMATION ON UNEMPLOYMENT AND UN-
EMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAMS 5-10 (Comm. Print 1975).
156 See notes 141-44 and accompanying text supra.
157 Currently before Congress is a bill that would entirely eliminate the 120% require-
ment. H.R. 10210, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
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for example, all but two states158 had seasonably-adjusted rates
above four percent, and were thus eligible for extended benefits. 159
F-SEUC benefits should trigger "on" in the states by means of the
four percent indicator. 60
4. The National Trigger
When the national trigger became legally effective at the begin-
ning of 1972, extended benefits were triggered "on" immediately
because the national rate of unemployment had exceeded 4.5 per-
cent for September, October, and November 1971.161 A slight drop
in the rate for December 1971, however, triggered benefits "off" in
March of 1972.162 The national indicator did not trigger "on" again
until February 1975,163 and has remained in effect since that
time.164
The 4.5 percent national trigger requirement has deprived
large numbers of unemployed workers of extended benefits. The
period between enactment and effectiveness for the original na-
tional trigger demonstrates the need for lowering this indicator.
158 The two states not qualifying for state benefits on May 17, 1975, were Texas and
Wyoming. SENATE Corits., supra note 7, at 21-22.
159 Id.
160 In legislation presently before Congress, the state trigger would be an insured un-
employment rate of 4.0% measured over a moving 13-week period. H.R. 10210, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975).
161 Extended benefits were triggered "on" in all states except Kentucky, whose legisla-
ture did not meet until 1972. At that time, it enacted legislation which made the state eligible
for extended benefits.
162 The national indicator was triggered "off" as of the week of March 5th, but benefits
did not cease until three weeks later.
163 See note 91 supra.
164 The following table lists the national insured unemployment rates for the purposes
of the national trigger from F-SEUC's inception to April 1975.
NATIONAL INSURED UNEMPLOYMENT RATE
[In percent)
Month 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
January 4.09 2.87 3.18 5.96
February 4.25 2.91 3.38 6.68
March 4.32 2.94 3.59 7.30
April 3.98 2.79 3.69 7.83
May 4.00 2.81 3.69
June 3.92 2.81 3.65
July 3.91 2.72 3.58
August 3.52 2.75 3.51
September 4.85 3.54 2.78 3.72
October 4.85 3.37 2.74 4.00
November 4.64 3.34 2.83 4.52
December 4.30 3.23 2.95 5.26
SENATE Cotm., supra note 7, at 4.
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From August 1970 through December 1971 the insured un-
employment rate was above four percent, with over three million
covered workers unemployed. A four percent trigger would have
made benefits available in December 1970; a 4.5 percent trigger
would not have made benefits available until July 1971.165
Based on past unemployment rates, a trigger set around four
percent would be a fair standard to aid the long-term un-
employed.' 66 A significantly lower percentage would tend to pro-
vide more coverage to the transitionally unemployed, not the long-
term unemployed.' 67 For example, a lower level of 3.5 percent
would have made benefits available for most of 1972, when the
average insured unemployment rate was only 3.3 percent. 68 Ben-
efits would also have been available again as early as June 1974,
when the rate was 3.65 percent. 69 The only period not covered by
such a trigger would have been 1973, which had an average rate of
2.8 percent.' 70
F-SEUC extended benefits should be available whenever there
is a clear trend in the economy toward widespread long-term un-
employment. 71 The experience of the national trigger in the last
165 Id. at 25. The F-SEUC indicator triggered "off" in March 1972 due to the 4.5%
requirement; with a 4.0% indicator, benefits would have remained available until September
1972. Id.
166 The Subcommittee on Extended Benefits Trigger for the National Executive Com-
mittee of the Interstate Conferences of Employment Security Agencies, at a December 1972
meeting, proposed that the national trigger be lowered from 4.5 to 4.0%. Based on the
statistics for the 1970-72 recession, they suggested that the national trigger had responded to
widespread unemployment too late. In arguing for the lower rate, the Subcommittee as-
serted that F-SEUC benefits would be more effective if made available early in an economic
downturn, as would have been the case had a 4% trigger been employed in the 1970-72
period. Interstate Conference of Employment Security Agencies, Explanatory Material and
Considerations For and Agtinst Agencies Changing Extended Benefit Trigger Formulas 3-4 (un-
dated), cited in M. MURRAY, supra note 28, at 47.
167 In discussions of unemployment benefits for transitionally and long-term un-
employed workers, there is an implicit assumption that there exists a residual percentage of
transitionally unemployed workers. As the unemployment rate rises above this residual level,
the change represents long-term unemployed workers. In theory, extended benefits should
trigger "on" when this residual level is exceeded. Triggers, although set at an arbitrary
standard, are designed
to make extended benefits responsive to recessional unemployment, triggers do not
operate to assist long-term unemployed workers in pockets of persistent unemploy-
ment, or to assist individual unemployed workers when they experience long-term
unemployment regardless of general economic conditions.
M. MURRAY, supra note 28, at 47.
168 SENATE COMM., supra note 7, at 23.
169 Id. at 26.
170 Id. at 23.
171 W. HABER & M. MURRAY, supra note 16, at 232-33; UPJOHN INSTrrUTE, PROGRAM
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five years demonstrates that a trigger of about four percent would
accomplish this goal. Congress recognized the four percent trigger
as a better indicator when it adopted that level in EUC 1974 and the
national trigger should be permanently set near four percent for
F-SEUC benefits. 7 2
D. Tax Rate and Wage Base Adjustments
The continuing high level of national unemployment has
created a financial crisis in the Federal Trust Fund. 17 3 The
emergency benefits created by Congress are financed from the fed-
eral tax on empfoyers. 174 Because the benefits paid out are greater
than the tax revenues coming in, however, the Administration has
estimated that it will be necessary to continue general revenue ad-
vances to the Federal Trust Fund indefinitefy, and that the total
funds available to the program will be inadequate by fiscal year
1977.175
The best solution to this financial morass would be to recognize
federal responsibility for long-term unemployment and earmark
general revenues for all benefit payments beyond thirty-nine
weeks,' 7 6 leaving the federal tax on employers to cover only the
thirteen weeks of F-SEUC benefits. In the absence of such reform,
an increase in the federal tax rate and wage base is needed as a stop-
gap measure1 77 For the calendar year 1977, the wage base should be
raised from its present level of $4,200178 to- provide increased
IMPROVEMENT, supra note 16, at 7 (reprinted in Hearings on Unemployment Compensation, supra
note 1, at 406).
172 Legislation currently before Congress proposes that the national trigger remain at
4.5%, but the rate would be seasonally adjusted and would be based on a moving 13-week
period instead of three consecutive months. H.R. 10210, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975). This
provision would allow the national trigger to go "on" more easily than under the present
federal provision.
173 See note 12supra.
174 See notes 12, 132-33 and accompanying textsupra.
175 Hearings on Unemployment Compensation, supra note 1, at 63 (statement of Lawrence E.
Weatherford, Acting Associate Manpower Administrator for Unemployment Insurance).
176 See notes 125-36 and accompanying text supra.
177 ECONOMIC SECURITY, EDUCATION AND MANPOWER SECTION OF THE CHAMBER OF COM-
MERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, DETAILED SUMMARY OF UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
AMENDMENTS OF 1975, PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR 2 (1975).
178 Although there is general agreement that a wage base increase is needed, there are
differences of opinion over what that increase should be. In legislation currently before
Congress, the taxable wage base would be raised from $4,200 to $8,000 as of Jan. 1, 1977.
H.R. 10210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The Administration, on the other hand, proposes
that the tax base be raised to $6,000 as ofJan. 1, 1977, with adjustments to be made every two
years up to the level of two-thirds of the average annual wage covered by the program for the
preceding year, rounded off to the next highest multiple of $1,000. DETAILED SUMMARY,SUpra
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revenues for the federal government, and for the states as well. 17 9
The federal unemployment tax rate should also be raised from its
present figure of 3.2 percent.' 80 These increases would bring an
influx of tax revenues into the Federal Trust Fund and produce
eventual solvency for the federal account.
CONCLUSION
Reliance upon the extended benefits program during the cur-
rent economic recession has demonstrated the need for different
methods to deal with long-term unemployment. The present system
is conceptually and financially inadequate to combat the effects of
such unemployment. A comprehensive retraining program would
be a better method to deal with the problems of the long-term
jobless. In recessionary periods, public works programs should also
be implemented to provide interim employment for those who can-
not be immediately reintegrated into the private sector of the
economy. Moreover, a shift to general revenue financing of benefits
beyond the thirty-ninth week and adjustments in the tax rate and
wage base are needed to bring financial stability to the present
extended benefits system. Finally, modifications of the trigger
mechanisms would produce a system more responsive to national
employment trends. Congress, recognizing the inadequacies of the
present system, is considering fundamental reforms to deal with
long-term unemployment. Such reform is urgently needed to al-
leviate the pressure on the unemployment compensation system.
Unemployment compensation, however, should remain the nation's
first line of defense against the hardships of recession.
Charles Evan Stewart
note 177, at 2. The Federal Advisory Council, although preferring federal responsibility for
benefits beyond the 39th week, proposes an increase in the wage base to $6,000. Memoran-
dum for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 136.
179 Memorandum for the Secretary of Labor, supra note 136.
180 'As with the taxable wage base (see note 178supra), there are varying recommendations
concerning the amount of increase needed in the federal unemployment tax. The Administra-
tion proposes that the tax rate be raised by 0.055%. DETAILED SUMMARY, SUpra note 177, at 2.
The House Ways and Means Committee, on the other hand, has reported out a bill that would
raise the tax rate by 0.2% as of Jan. 1, 1976. H.R. 10210, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). This
increase would be temporary, ending either in 1982, or in the year after all advances to the
Federal Unemployment Compensation Account have been repaid, whichever is earlier.
